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Most people would agree that a patient should
always be able to spend his own money on the
health care services he desires. Yet that freedom is
often threatened or denied when government tries
to provide  universal health insurance coverage, as
in the U.S. Medicare program, which provides
health insurance to seniors and people with dis-
abilities. Over the past 20 years, the Medicare
bureaucracy—and to a lesser extent Congress
itself—has limited the freedom of Medicare bene-
ficiaries to purchase medical services with their
own money. Those limitations violate beneficia-
ries’ right to privacy, undermine a tool that could
reduce the burden Medicare imposes on taxpay-
ers, and may deny care to Medicare beneficiaries
outright, or deny them access to the highest qual-
ity care available. 
Ironically, as the U.S. government has restrict-
ed the ability of patients to spend their own
money on medical care, Canada’s socialized
health care system is moving in the opposite direc-
tion. In a landmark case handed down in 2005,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the
province of Quebec could not prohibit its citizens
from purchasing covered services through private
health insurance. That ruling recognized that
imposing limits on a patient’s freedom to spend
his own money can result in his being denied cru-
cial and even life-saving medical services.
This threat to patients’ rights would grow
under many proposals to have the federal or state
governments provide universal coverage. Congress
and the state legislatures should avoid universal
coverage schemes that would undermine this fun-
damental human right, or tempt future legisla-
tures and bureaucrats to do so. Instead, Congress
should restore to American seniors the unfettered
right to spend their own money on medical care. 
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Introduction
Most people would agree that a patient
should always be able to spend his own money
on the health care services he desires. Western
liberal tradition and American jurisprudence
both counsel that individuals possess a natur-
al right to obtain medical care with their own
resources, free from government interference.1
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story wrote
that each citizen “is the proper guardian of his
own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual,”2 a proposition reiterated by the
19th-century legal scholar Thomas Cooley,3
and in 1890 by future Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis.4 That proposition and those
writings were the fountainhead for the
Supreme Court’s declaration that the Consti-
tution protects an individual’s “right of priva-
cy,” which the Supreme Court has held “is
older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school sys-
tem.”5 For years, the courts have protected the
individual’s right to seek and obtain health
care services he deems important, free from
government interference.6 The Supreme
Court has voided state statutes criminalizing
abortion on the basis that such decisions
involve a woman’s exercise of a fundamental
liberty to obtain medical services she deems
necessary for her self-preservation.7
Government programs that attempt to
provide universal coverage, such as the U.S.
Medicare program, threaten that fundamen-
tal liberty. No issue more clearly illustrates the
threat that national health insurance schemes
pose to individual rights than the federal gov-
ernment’s attempts to prohibit Americans in
the federal Medicare program from spending
their own money on medical care. Enacted in
1965 as a cornerstone of President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s “Great Society,” Medicare is a fed-
erally financed program designed to help
elderly and disabled citizens pay for health
care services. At the time of its enactment,
there was serious concern that Medicare
would eliminate a patient’s right to choose his
doctor, his right to choose what health care
services he receives, and his right to choose
how to purchase those services. Congress
claimed that it resolved those fears in 1965
when it included two provisions in the pre-
amble to the Medicare law. The first provision
guaranteed that beneficiaries would be free to
obtain health care services from any provider
“qualified to participate” in Medicare.8 The
second stated that nothing in the Medicare
statute “shall be construed . . . to preclude” a
beneficiary “from purchasing or otherwise
securing protection against the cost of any
health services.”9
Both of those provisions proved to be
empty promises. Over the years, the “free
choice guarantee” has been stripped of all
meaning. No plaintiff has ever successfully
invoked it to enjoin the implementation of
subsequent amendments to Medicare that
actually restrict patient choice.10 After Con-
gress enacted Medicare, private insurers effec-
tively ceased to offer comprehensive health
insurance to the elderly, which made the sec-
ond guarantee meaningless.11 However, “pro-
tection against the cost of health care services”
could also be construed to include a beneficia-
ry’s paying his own money for health care ser-
vices. That option was always presumed to be
available. After all, neither Congress nor any of
its administrative creatures would deny anyone
the right to use his own money to purchase the
health care services he desired. Or would they?
In fact, the Medicare bureaucracy—and to a
lesser extent Congress itself—has aggressively
tried to limit the ability of Medicare beneficia-
ries to purchase medical services with their
own money. Medicare beneficiaries have com-
plete freedom to spend their own money on
medical services that are not covered under the
Medicare program. However, the federal gov-
ernment effectively prohibits beneficiaries
from purchasing Medicare-covered services
with their own money. As a result, Medicare
beneficiaries effectively have no freedom to go
outside the Medicare program either to obtain
higher-quality care or to keep certain medical
information private. Only the wealthiest
seniors, who can afford to opt out of the
Medicare program entirely, can avoid this
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threat to their freedom to spend their own
money on medical care.
Often, it is uncertain whether Medicare will
cover a particular service. Medicare reimburses
providers only for services that Medicare’s
bureaucracy deems “medically necessary.”
When there is ambiguity about whether
Medicare considers a service “medically neces-
sary,” Medicare regulations provide an avenue
for a beneficiary to pay for the otherwise-cov-
ered service himself if Medicare ultimately
decides the service was not “medically neces-
sary.” However, physicians who use that
avenue risk fines and other penalties. As dis-
cussed below, the Medicare bureaucracy has
promised not to harass those physicians as
much as it has in the past, yet that promise
was issued by an unelected bureaucrat and
may be revoked at any time by another
unelected bureaucrat. 
Medicare’s efforts to restrict private pay-
ment have disturbing effects beyond just
infringing on the beneficiary’s right to spend
his own money as he sees fit. Curtailing the
right to self-pay violates beneficiaries’ privacy
rights. When beneficiaries receive services under
Medicare, a claim must be filed with the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). Those claims may contain personal
medical information that beneficiaries would
prefer to keep private. Self-payment enables
beneficiaries to obtain services (e.g., psychiatric
counseling) without that information being
logged into government databases, where it
could be compromised. A recent government
report found that “47 percent of Medicare
Advantage contractors reported privacy breach-
es within the past 2 years, as did . . . 42 percent
of Medicare [fee-for-service] contractors.”12
Prohibiting or restricting the ability to self-pay
erodes the beneficiary’s right to keep such infor-
mation private.
As a fiscal matter, self-payment would relieve
taxpayers from paying for some aspects of ben-
eficiaries’ care. For decades, experts have warned
that Medicare is in dire financial straits. In
2007, Medicare’s board of trustees reported,
“The [Medicare] program could be brought
into actuarial balance over the next 75 years by
an immediate 122 percent increase in the pay-
roll tax, or an immediate 51 percent reduction
in program outlays or some combination of the
two.”13 Restricting beneficiaries’ ability to self-
pay undermines a tool that could relieve the
burden Medicare imposes on taxpayers.
Finally, restricting this freedom can deny
beneficiaries access to medical care. If the
government pays so little for a “covered” ser-
vice that physicians refuse to provide it, then
preventing the beneficiary from purchasing
that service himself cuts off access to that ser-
vice entirely. As a result, the beneficiary may
have to settle for lower-quality care. Access
problems are likely to grow more acute in
coming years. With scholars claiming that
Americans pay higher prices for medical care
than citizens of other countries,14 Congress
will increasingly look to provider-payment
cuts as Medicare’s fiscal problems mount.
Prohibiting beneficiaries from spending
their own money on medical care eliminates
what could become an increasingly impor-
tant safety valve for future generations of
Medicare enrollees, including baby boomers.
Critics of the right to self-pay argue that
allowing beneficiaries and providers to opt
out of Medicare on a service-by-service basis
would create a “two-tiered” health care sys-
tem, where the wealthy could obtain better
care than beneficiaries who are not affluent
enough to self-pay.15 Yet, ironically, restricting
self-payment itself creates the very type of
“two-tiered” health care system that oppo-
nents seek to prevent. Only those seniors who
depend on Medicare find themselves subject
to invasions of privacy and a loss of control
over their medical decisions. The wealthiest
seniors, in contrast, are beyond Medicare’s
grasp. They may avoid such harassment by
opting out of the program entirely. 
Critics also object that private contracts
between physicians and Medicare beneficiaries
could lead to fraud, as when physicians bill
both the patient and the Medicare program for
the same service.16 This criticism presents a
very real concern. For almost two decades, the
Government Accountability Office has desig-
nated Medicare a “high-risk” program because
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of its vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement. In 2005, the GAO reported,
“Medicare will continue to be a high-risk pro-
gram for the foreseeable future.”17 Medicare
fraud, however, is an issue between the
provider and Medicare. It is unjust to deny ben-
eficiaries the freedom to purchase medical care
with their own money based on the misdeeds
of physicians.
This threat to the freedom of American
patients may be on the rise. Many health care
reformers would have government provide
universal coverage to all Americans.18 Some
reformers have even proposed expanding
Medicare itself to cover all Americans not
currently enrolled.19 Such reforms would give
the federal government similar powers to
determine whether non-elderly persons may
spend their own funds on medical care. 
The threat has arisen at the state level as
well. In 2006, the California legislature passed
a universal coverage plan that provided, “No
health care service plan contract or health
insurance policy, except for the [state] plan,
may be sold in California for services provided
by the [state-run] system.”20 Only a veto by
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) prevented the
California legislature from outlawing private
health insurance for most medical services.
To add another layer of irony, as the United
States has moved to restrict the ability of
patients to spend their own money on medical
care, Canada’s socialized health care system is
moving in the opposite direction. In a land-
mark case handed down in 2005, the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down a provision sim-
ilar to that in the California legislation.21 The
high court ruled that the province of Quebec
could not prohibit private health insurance as
a means of self-payment. That ruling recog-
nized that limiting the patient’s freedom to
spend his own money can result in the denial
of crucial and even life-saving medical services.
The U.S. Medicare Program
The history of the U.S. Medicare program
offers one illustration of how universal health
care schemes threaten the patient’s right to
purchase medical care with his own money.
Medicare consists of four fundamental parts.22
Part A is a mandatory program that insures eli-
gible elderly or disabled beneficiaries against
some of the costs associated with hospital care.
Part B provides coverage for other health-care
costs, including physicians’ services.23 Part B
claims are processed by private insurance com-
panies known as “carriers” that are awarded
contracts through a competitive bidding
process conducted by the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services
(hereinafter “the Secretary” and “HHS”).24 Part
C of Medicare was formerly known as the
Medicare + Choice Program, and is now called
Medicare Advantage.25 Part C allows beneficia-
ries to choose from a number of private health
plans, many of which cost more, and offer
more benefits, than “traditional” Medicare (i.e.,
Parts A & B). Part D is the new Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit.26
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), formerly the Health Care
Financing Administration, is the division of
HHS that oversees the operation of Medicare.
CMS is responsible for entering into contracts
with carriers to administer Part B and for over-
seeing each carrier’s activities. Those carriers
are contractually required to administer Part B
of Medicare in accordance with the Medicare
statute, as well as with the regulations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary and the policies and
directives issued by CMS.27
Although all three branches of govern-
ment routinely refer to Part B of Medicare as
“voluntary,” it is not.28 Nevertheless, a benefi-
ciary may dis-enroll from Medicare altogeth-
er either by failing to pay the premiums or by
forwarding a written notice of his determina-
tion to the Social Security Administration or
CMS.29 Interestingly, until 1997, neither the
statutes nor regulations ever addressed
declining Medicare coverage of specific ser-
vices. It was always assumed that a Medicare
beneficiary could privately pay for health care
services when and if it was in his interest to
do so. Over the past two decades, however,
Congress and CMS have effectively prevented
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Medicare enrollees from purchasing medical
care with their own money if those services
are also covered by Medicare.
For purposes of Part B, physicians must
elect to be “participating” or “non-participat-
ing” each year.30 A “participating” physician
agrees to accept the amount that Medicare
determines should be paid for each service.
“Participating” physicians bill carriers directly.
The carrier, upon favorable adjudication of
the claim, pays the physician 80 percent of the
Medicare-allowed amount. The beneficiary is
responsible only for the remaining 20 percent
as well as for an initial $100 deductible. In
other words, a “participating” physician may
not charge (or “balance bill”) Medicare benefi-
ciaries for an amount in excess of the price
determined by Medicare.31 A physician who
elects to be “non-participating” may still see
Medicare beneficiaries and may still receive
payment from Medicare carriers. The main
difference is that “non-participating” physi-
cians may choose, on a service-by-service basis,
either to bill the beneficiary directly or to
“accept assignment” of the beneficiary’s claim
from the Medicare carrier. 
Physicians and beneficiaries were not
always subject to binding price controls. For
many years after the enactment of Medicare,
“nonparticipating” physicians were free to bill
beneficiaries for whatever amounts they deter-
mined reasonable. In 1984, however, Congress
froze physicians’ fees.32 In 1989, Congress pro-
hibited “nonparticipating” physicians from
charging Medicare Part B enrollees anything
in excess of a “limiting charge” established by
the Secretary.33
Physicians also face other restrictions
regarding billing and claims. For example,
CMS requires physicians to bill Medicare carri-
ers for certain services. In the 1980s, Congress
required all physicians (even “nonparticipat-
ing” physicians) to accept assignment for all
clinical diagnostic laboratory services.34 In
addition, whenever a physician provides ser-
vices “for which payment is made under [Part
B],” he must submit a claim form to the carri-
er—even if the physician is “nonparticipating”
and does not wish to accept assignment of the
claim. If the physician fails to submit a claim to
the carrier, the Secretary may sanction the
physician.35 Finally, if a physician performs a
service that the carrier determines was “not rea-
sonable or necessary,” which is the criterion for
whether it is a Medicare-covered service, the
carrier will deny payment, and the physician
must refund any payment he received from the
beneficiary. If such services are performed
more than once, the physician may be fined up
to $10,000 per instance. He may then face
exclusion from Medicare,36 which can devas-
tate a physician’s practice. 
However, if a physician believes that
Medicare may not cover an otherwise-covered
service because the carrier would conclude the
service was not “reasonable or necessary,” the
physician (whether “participating” or “non-
participating”) can enter into an “advance
beneficiary notice” (ABN) with the Medicare
enrollee. Under an ABN, the beneficiary
agrees to pay for the service personally if the
carrier denies payment. 
Although it appears to resemble a private
contract between the physician and patient, an
ABN is not a private contract. A private con-
tract, whether for a Medicare-covered service
or a noncovered service, would avoid any con-
tact with the Medicare program. In contrast,
the ABN is basically a bureaucratic process
used to determine whether a service is or is not
eligible for Medicare coverage when the physi-
cian is unsure whether the carrier will consid-
er that service “medically necessary.”37 Under
an ABN, a claim must still be filed with the
Medicare carrier. If the carrier determines
either that a physician has entered into ABNs
“routinely” or that the physician has provided
too many services that were not “reasonable
and necessary,” the carrier could fine the
physician up to $10,000 for each item or ser-
vice and possibly exclude him from the
Medicare program altogether.38
However, if the beneficiary and physician
never sought Medicare reimbursement—that is,
if no “payment is made under [Part B]”—it was
previously presumed that these regulatory
requirements did not apply. It was presumed
that Medicare would operate like private
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health insurance, which generally requires
claims to be filed only when a patient or a
provider actually seeks reimbursement from
the insurance carrier. Yet in the early 1990s,
HCFA began to prohibit physicians from
entering into private-pay agreements with
Medicare beneficiaries.
Stewart et al. v. Sullivan
The first test of such private contracts
came in the case Stewart et al. v. Sullivan. Dr.
Lois Copeland, a “nonparticipating” physi-
cian practicing internal medicine in Bergen
County, New Jersey, had a substantial geri-
atric practice. Many of her elderly patients
wanted her to visit them more often than
HCFA deemed “reasonable and necessary.”39
In 1992, HCFA limited such visits to one per
month. Dr. Copeland’s patients were scat-
tered throughout Bergen County in various
nursing homes. For her to comply with her
patients’ requests caused a significant invest-
ment of her time. She informed them she
would accede to their requests if they would
agree to pay her themselves. Otherwise, she
would have to file claims and ABNs with the
local Medicare carrier. Not only would those
claims not be paid, they would have invited
the carrier to sanction Dr. Copeland for per-
forming “unreasonable” and “unnecessary”
services.40 The patients all understood and
readily agreed.
Dr. Copeland soon received bulletins
issued by several carriers warning physicians
about such private-pay agreements with
Medicare beneficiaries. “[A] provider,” one
read, “must abide by all Medicare rules and
regulations [as long as covered services are
provided]. The law cannot be bypassed by hav-
ing patients sign a disclaimer stating that ser-
vices provided to them should not be billed to
Medicare.”41 Later, Dr. Copeland received a
copy of a letter written by Gail R. Wilensky, the
administrator of HCFA, dated October 15,
1991, asserting:
We expect almost all patients who have
Part B coverage will choose to use that
coverage regardless of their financial
means. . . . We are not aware of any
instances where a patient has initiated
agreements with a physician to the
effect that Medicare will not be billed
for the physician’s services.
Furthermore, such an agreement
initiated by a physician would be
invalid. In the rare event, however, that
a patient, for his or her own reasons,
and entirely independently, chooses
not to use Part B coverage, the law does
not require the submission of a claim
by the physician.
Where patients have Part B enroll-
ment, a patient can choose not to use
Part B coverage for certain physician
services. However, by law, the physician
is still required to follow certain
Medicare requirements other than the
claims submission requirement. This
would include the limiting charge pro-
vision applicable to a non-participat-
ing physician when assignment is
accepted, or advance written notice to
the patient when the physician fur-
nishes services which are not consid-
ered reasonable and necessary under
Medicare guidelines.42
Not long after Dr. Copeland received the
Wilensky letter, another doctor forwarded to
her a letter from a HCFA official that stated:
“HCFA does not pursue or promote the use of
private agreements. However, HCFA would
not be bound by a private agreement if the
Medicare beneficiary complained or filed a
claim for the service provided under the pri-
vate agreement.”43
In other words, HCFA asserted that (1)
physician-initiated private contracts were
flatly prohibited; (2) when a beneficiary initi-
ates a private contract, physicians must
inform the beneficiary when HCFA thinks a
service would be unreasonable or unneces-
sary; (3) HCFA has the authority to set the
prices for those purely private transactions;
and (4) HCFA could and would sanction
physicians when a patient reneges on a con-
tract that the patient himself initiated.
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Notably, HCFA confined allowable private
contracts to those initiated by the patient—
which HCFA officials expected would never
happen. The carrier bulletin went even far-
ther, claiming that absolutely no transac-
tions between a physician and a beneficiary—
not even beneficiary-initiated transactions
with which the beneficiary was perfectly sat-
isfied—were exempt from any Medicare rules
and regulations. These restrictions evinced a
clear desire by HCFA officials to deny benefi-
ciaries the freedom to spend their own
money on covered services. 
HCFA claimed these rules were based on a
subsection of the Medicare statute that pro-
hibits “non-participating” physicians from
billing, “on a repeated basis,” “individuals
enrolled” in Medicare “an actual charge in
excess of the limiting charge.” That subsec-
tion further provides:
For services furnished on or after
September 1, 1990, within one year
after the date of providing a service for
which payment is made under this part on a
reasonable charge or fee schedule basis,
a physician . . . shall complete and sub-
mit a claim for such service on a stan-
dard claim form specified by the
Secretary to the carrier on behalf of the
beneficiary. . . . 44
HCFA also pointed to provisions prohibiting
physicians from billing beneficiaries “in
excess of the maximum allowable actual
charge” and from billing for services that
“the carrier determines” are “otherwise cov-
ered” but are “not reasonable and neces-
sary.”45 HCFA ignored the fact that these
strictures applied only to services “for which
payment is made under this part” of the
Medicare statute—a standard similar to what
exists in the private insurance context. In
other words, if Medicare makes no payment,
the federal government has no reason or
authority to interfere in the doctor-patient
relationship. Importantly, HCFA implement-
ed this sweeping policy without going
through the procedures required by the
Administrative Procedure Act, such as giving
the public an opportunity to comment
before the policy became final and was
enforced.46 Instead, the agency sought to
enforce its extraordinary interpretation of
the Medicare statute by means of bulletins
issued by the carriers and by threatening
sanctions.
Dr. Copeland felt compelled to seek relief
from the courts. She and five of her patients
filed a civil action in U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey seeking a declara-
tion of rights and injunctive relief enjoining
the enforcement of the threats made by
HCFA and Medicare carriers. The complaint
was an attack upon government interference
in Medicare beneficiaries’ freedom to pur-
chase health care services outside of Medicare.
The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, claiming: (1) that he had
imposed no policy; (2) that there was no proof
that the carrier bulletins were authorized by
him; and (3) that the plaintiffs were literally
attacking something that did not exist. The
plaintiffs countered by illustrating: (1) that
the carriers, by law and by contract, speak for
the Secretary; (2) that the threats were issued
by those carriers pursuant to their relation-
ship with the Secretary; and (3) that the
Wilensky letter illustrated the origin of the
bulletins. The plaintiffs pointed to a 1989
case where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found that carrier bulletins had
been directed by the Secretary, concluded that
the Medicare statute did not support the
Secretary’s interpretation, and ordered the
district court to enjoin enforcement of the
disputed policy.47
After hearing the arguments in Dr.
Copeland’s case, the U.S. District Court in
Newark, New Jersey, found that Copeland had
standing because “the Secretary has articulated
a broad policy that would subject Dr.
Copeland to sanctions for entering into private
agreements with her patients.”48 Because the
patients would have to completely dis-enroll
from Medicare to obtain the desired services
from Dr. Copeland, and because there was no
private insurance available for them in the mar-
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ketplace, the court was further satisfied that
“foregoing all Medicare benefits in exchange
for care from a physician of their choice” is an
“injury-in-fact” sufficient to confer standing
upon the plaintiff patients. Yet on the issue of
“ripeness,” the court found that the Secretary
had not “clearly stated his position on a posed
issue.” The court went on to say:
[T]he Secretary has not promulgated
any rules or regulations either formally
or informally espousing the policy
alleged by the plaintiffs. Nor have
plaintiffs demonstrated that the bul-
letins supplied by the carriers were
issued on behalf of or at the direction
of the Secretary. Nor have plaintiffs
demonstrated that the documents rep-
resent statements of the Secretary
intended to have the force of law such
that conformity to them in the admin-
istration process would be expected.49
Of course, the Secretary had taken a posi-
tion. If he had not, the plaintiffs could not
have had standing. “Standing” means the
plaintiff has a private, substantive, legally
protected interest that is being invaded or
will be invaded by the challenged conduct.50
If the Secretary had not taken a position,
there would be nothing to invade the plain-
tiffs’ legally protected interest. Moreover, Dr.
Copeland had clearly been “placed in the
dilemma of incurring the disadvantages of
complying or risking penalties for noncom-
pliance”—the standard for ripeness adopted
by most circuit courts.51 Nevertheless, judg-
ment was entered for the Secretary.
The Stewart decision left the freedom to
self-pay in a state of confusion. Could Dr.
Copeland engage in private contracting with
her patients? After all, the court found the
Secretary had no “clearly articulated policy.”
Or would HCFA and the carriers behave as
they indicated they would in the bulletins and
warning letters? Not surprisingly, all sides
announced victory. HCFA claimed that the
court adopted its arguments. Dr. Copeland
could claim that, in the absence of a clearly
articulated policy forbidding the practice, she
was free to contract privately with her patients.
Yet only the government really prevailed; the
rule of law and the rights of Medicare benefi-
ciaries took a beating. The court’s ruling left
behind enough uncertainty that few physi-
cians would be willing to contract privately,
for fear of being sanctioned. With Stewart, the
federal court shied away from questioning
government behavior that was not only totally
contrary to the Medicare statute and the
requirements of the APA but was at odds with
Article I, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution,
under which Congress alone has the power to
legislate.52
In 1993, in the wake of Stewart, HCFA
amended its official Medicare Carriers’ Manual
to adopt the more restrictive interpretation
that had appeared in carrier bulletins, which
went well beyond the statutory interpretation
detailed in previous letters from HCFA offi-
cials. That is, the 1993 Medicare Carriers’
Manual asserted that nothing in the law allows
private contracts to avoid the requirements of
the Medicare statute (including requirements
to submit claims on a beneficiary’s behalf,
accept assignment for clinical diagnostic labo-
ratory tests, and bill no more than the limiting
charge), that those statutory requirements
cannot be negotiated between a physician and
beneficiary, and that any such agreement
would have no legal force or effect. In other
words, HCFA effectively prohibited private
contracts between Medicare beneficiaries and
their physicians. The Secretary later claimed
that amending the Medicare Carriers’ Manual
was “precisely the type of expression of policy
the court in Stewart suggested.”53 It also repre-
sented the type of legislating that the
Constitution empowers only Congress to do.
At a minimum, it represented precisely the
type of rule-making that required public
notice and comment under the APA.
Section 4507 and United Seniors Association
et al. v. Shalala
Despite the Secretary’s acknowledgment of
an official policy, the issue was hardly settled.
A few physicians had responded to the ambi-
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guity created by the Stewart decision by enter-
ing into private contracts with Medicare bene-
ficiaries. When Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) introduced
legislation that would protect private con-
tracting, the Clinton administration and
other opponents amended the Kyl proposal,
which ultimately became Section 4507 of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.54 Under Section
4507, if a physician provides even a single
Medicare-covered service to a single self-pay-
ing Medicare beneficiary, that physician is
completely barred from Medicare for a period
of two years. That change effectively gutted
Kyl’s proposal and preserved the ban on pri-
vate contracts.
The practical effect of Section 4507 is that
Medicare beneficiaries can self-pay only with
those doctors who opt out of Medicare entire-
ly—a choice that would be left to the physi-
cians, not the patients. Yet because Medicare
comprises a large share of most physicians’
patient base, few physicians could afford to
withdraw from Medicare altogether. Accord-
ing to one affidavit, only 4.4 percent of family
practitioners would be able to contract pri-
vately after January 1, 1998. Virtually no radi-
ologists or anesthesiologists would be able to
do so. No more than 3 percent of the nation’s
surgeons would be able to do so. And of
course, all gerontologists accept Medicare
reimbursement.55
With the changes to the Medicare Carriers’
Manual and the passage of Section 4507, the
right of Medicare beneficiaries to self-pay
effectively disappeared. Previously, Medicare
beneficiaries could purchase covered services
outside the Medicare program with any
physician they chose. Under Section 4507, the
pool of physicians with whom the patient
could self-pay was narrowed to the small
minority of physicians who opt out of
Medicare entirely. That effectively eliminated
the right to self-pay for all but the wealthiest
seniors, who can afford to opt out of Medi-
care themselves. (Even “participating” physi-
cians remain free to accept self-payment from
non-Medicare enrollees.)
Previous efforts by the Secretary (then
Donna Shalala) to sanction physicians for
providing what HCFA believed were unrea-
sonable or unnecessary services had reduced
physicians’ use of ABNs. Now, with the enact-
ment of Section 4507, there was no way for
patients to self-pay for some services. In other
words, Section 4507 was actually denying
care to some beneficiaries. Once again, bene-
ficiaries called upon the courts to address the
issue. 
The second test of private contracting
came in a case called United Seniors Association et
al. v. Shalala. This time, an organization called
the United Seniors Association and four of its
members who were Medicare beneficiaries
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia on December 30, 1997.
Their complaint claimed that Section 4507
violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution. The plaintiffs claimed, among other
things, that Section 4507 invaded the privacy
of Medicare beneficiaries and represented an
exercise of power not contemplated in Article
I, Section 8, of the Constitution.56
As in Stewart, the plaintiffs in United Seniors
did not ask the courts to declare that the
Constitution guarantees a broad right of
Medicare beneficiaries and their physicians to
contract privately—despite some feeling
among proponents of private contracting that
the plaintiffs should have done so.
Proponents of that strategy maintained, cor-
rectly, that even when Medicare makes services
available through a participating physician,
Congress has no legitimate power to deny a
beneficiary the options of paying for those ser-
vices himself, paying more than Medicare pre-
scribes, or purchasing them from the physi-
cian of his choice. The plaintiffs reasoned,
however, that the courts would be more likely
to strike down an act of Congress that actual-
ly denied care to beneficiaries than to declare
that the Constitution broadly forbids any
infringement on the right of patients and
physicians to contract privately. For strategic
reasons, then, the plaintiffs argued only that
Section 4507 should be struck down because,
for many beneficiaries, it made certain medical
services effectively unavailable. Such a denial
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of care would infringe upon the right to priva-
cy as embedded in the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. 
Establishing that Section 4507 denied care
to beneficiaries was therefore critical to getting
a court to void that provision on constitution-
al grounds. Without a clear presentation that
Section 4507 was denying health care to
Medicare beneficiaries, no court would seri-
ously entertain a constitutional challenge.
Consequently, the plaintiffs went to consider-
able lengths to illustrate how that provision
denied care. Physicians testifying on behalf of
United Seniors cited examples. Prostate-spe-
cific antigen tests, an otherwise covered service
to detect prostate cancer, generally could not
be provided more frequently than Medicare
considered “medically necessary” unless the
patient paid for the test himself. A host of
other screening tests were often performed
with less symptomology than the Secretary
prescribed.57 The sanctions attached to
Secretary Shalala’s strict policing of ABNs
made physicians reluctant to pursue that
option. By eliminating beneficiaries’ freedom
to pay for those services themselves, Section
4507 effectively denied beneficiaries access to
those services. Section 4507 not only denied
care to Medicare beneficiaries outright; in
some cases, it could deny beneficiaries the best
care available. For example, if the amount
Medicare paid for arthroscopic knee surgery
was too low, surgeons might instead perform
a “total knee replacement”—an antiquated
procedure that is more invasive and painful
for the patient.58
No doubt some physicians over-bill Medi-
care for such services. However, the members
of the United Seniors Association sought
nothing more than the right to purchase these
services with their own money. The federal
government should have the power to deter-
mine what services it will and will not cover,
particularly if it can base those decisions on
scientific evidence. However, neither Congress
nor the Medicare bureaucracy has any legiti-
mate power to prevent seniors from spending
their own money on medical care. 
Contrary to the position taken by the pre-
vious administration in Stewart, the Clinton
administration’s HHS Secretary responded
to the United Seniors petition by arguing that
private contracting had always been prohibit-
ed under Medicare.59 With respect to her
additions to the 1993 Medicare Carriers
Manual, the Secretary claimed that Section
4507 was a “liberalization” of that ban in that
it gave physicians the option to contract pri-
vately if they withdrew from the Medicare
program for two years.60 In other words,
Secretary Shalala’s argument in United Seniors
was that Secretary Sullivan’s argument in
Stewart (that there was no policy prohibiting
private contracting) was erroneous. Yet the
Stewart court had relied upon that error in
rendering its opinion. 
Moving for summary judgment, the
Secretary claimed that the plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate an actual case or controversy
or to allege a sufficient injury to maintain
standing. She further argued that the privacy
of Medicare beneficiaries was not impaired by
the enforcement of Section 4507 as Medicare
beneficiaries had waived their right to privacy
by enrolling in the program. At bottom, coun-
sel for the Secretary argued:
[The plaintiffs] don’t want to get out
of Medicare; they want everything
Medicare will give them. But in selec-
tive cases, they want to get out when it
suits their interests and they can afford
it. And what you will have is a system
whereby the rich can buy what they
want and those many beneficiaries
who are on fixed incomes will not be
able to afford those services.61
Judge Thomas Hogan replied: “I think [the
foregoing argument] is probably congres-
sional policy, but I think it is wrong.”62
In the end, the court awarded the Secretary
summary judgment. Although stating that it
was “concerned . . . that the regulations and
interpretations by HCFA further limit
patient’s access to physicians of their own
choosing,” the court refused to find that the
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Constitution confers upon the citizen a priva-
cy right to seek and obtain health care services,
free from governmental interference. The
court said nothing about the denial of care.
Rather, it commented that it “is not inclined
to create new areas of constitutional protec-
tion.”63 What new areas of constitutional pro-
tection had the U.S. District Court been asked
to “create”? What made the right to privacy,
which the Supreme Court had recognized for
decades,64 a new area of constitutional protec-
tion? 
When the United Seniors plaintiffs ap-
pealed that decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the
Secretary came to oral arguments with a new
approach. Counsel for the Secretary claimed
that HCFA would no longer sanction physi-
cians who utilize ABNs so long as the services
rendered “are in accordance with accepted
standards of medical care even though they
do not meet Medicare’s particular and often
unique coverage requirements.”65 The Secre-
tary argued that new regulations were being
promulgated, and indeed, new regulations
appeared 10 days after oral argument. 
The Secretary’s new policy toward ABNs
reduced the risk of sanctions for physicians
who use ABNs to provide care that carriers
later determine to be out of step with
Medicare’s standards for medical necessity.66
In other words, Medicare would less often
interfere when patients used their own money
to purchase noncovered services, which
reduced the likelihood that HCFA’s effective
ban on private contracting would deny care to
beneficiaries. As such, the Secretary’s new pol-
icy essentially conceded that the combined
effect of HCFA’s restrictions on ABNs and
Section 4507’s effective ban on private con-
tracting was denying medical care to Medicare
beneficiaries. Otherwise, there would have
been no reason to relax its policing of ABNs. 
The court concluded that the Secretary’s
new “liberalizing” of the ABN procedure
allowed beneficiaries to obtain the care they
were being denied by the enactment of
Section 4507. As far as the court was con-
cerned, the constitutional issue ceased to
exist the moment that the Secretary changed
the official policy toward ABNs. Only by
backing away from her insistence on threat-
ening physicians who utilized ABNs did the
Secretary provide the court a means of decid-
ing the issue without addressing the validity
of Section 4507.67
The following describes the conditions
under which Medicare beneficiaries are free
to purchase medical care in the wake of
United Seniors and the Secretary’s relaxed pol-
icy toward ABNs:
1. When it is obvious that Medicare does
not cover particular services, a benefi-
ciary is free to spend his own money on
those services without fear of reprisals
against him or the provider.
2. If Medicare coverage of a particular ser-
vice hinges on a “medical necessity”
determination by a carrier, and the physi-
cian believes that the carrier may deter-
mine the service will not be covered, the
Secretary’s relaxed policy toward ABNs
makes it less likely that the physician will
be penalized for providing that service.
The relaxed ABN policy therefore
increases seniors’ freedom to purchase
such noncovered services and reduces
(but does not eliminate) the likelihood
that seniors will be denied access to such
services.
3. If a service is covered by Medicare,
Section 4507 effectively prohibits bene-
ficiaries from purchasing that service
themselves. At present, Section 4507 sel-
dom denies care to beneficiaries—but
only because Medicare payments to
providers are generally sufficient to
guarantee access. It is likely, however,
that as Medicare’s fiscal pressures
mount Congress eventually will reduce
provider payments, which will reduce
beneficiaries’ access to care. If and when
that occurs, Section 4507 will deny care
to Medicare beneficiaries, because it will
prevent beneficiaries from going outside
Medicare to purchase those services
themselves. In the meantime, even
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though most beneficiaries enjoy full
access to covered services, Section 4507
effectively eliminates beneficiaries’ right
to keep their medical records private,
because it eliminates their freedom to
purchase covered services (e.g., psychi-
atric care) outside the Medicare pro-
gram.
Importantly, the Secretary’s new ABN pol-
icy did not surrender the Medicare bureau-
cracy’s power to interfere with the provision
of noncovered services. It merely changed the
standard that the Medicare bureaucracy
would use to decide which of those private
contracts they would prohibit. Just as Secre-
tary Shalala unilaterally relaxed that stan-
dard, a subsequent secretary could reinstate
the previous standard or curtail that freedom
even further. Medicare beneficiaries are effec-
tively barred from spending their own money
on covered services and are free to spend their
own money on noncovered services only at
the pleasure of an unelected bureaucrat.
The United Seniors case marginally expand-
ed the freedom of Medicare beneficiaries to
obtain noncovered services at their own
expense by pushing the Secretary to allow
physicians to provide that care more freely
without fear of sanction. However, it was that
very change that allowed the court to avoid
the question of whether Section 4507 is con-
stitutionally deficient. That is, the courts
have yet to consider whether Congress or
CMS has any legitimate power to prevent
Medicare beneficiaries from spending their
own money on medical care. As a result, that
freedom languishes for all but the wealthiest
seniors.
Chaoulli et al. v. Quebec
Around the same time that the debate over
the right to purchase medical care reached an
uneasy standoff in the United States, Canada
was gearing up to expand that freedom. In
Canada, a national health insurance regime,
also known as Medicare but covering all citi-
zens, had been in place for many years. The
provincial governments administer nearly all
health care services to their citizens through
Medicare programs that conform to the feder-
al Canada Health Act. In Quebec, provincial
legislation prohibited residents from purchas-
ing health insurance that covers services
already covered under Quebec’s Medicare pro-
gram. What made the prohibition against pri-
vate insurance so onerous were the long and
widely recognized waiting lists for even life-
saving medical treatment.
In 1997, a physician, Dr. Jacques Chaoulli,
and a patient, George Zeliotis, brought a civil
action in Quebec challenging the constitu-
tionality of this prohibition.68 Like the plain-
tiffs in United Seniors, Chaoulli and Zeliotis
claimed that the prohibition violated their
rights under the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms,69 and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.70 They reasoned that
because the consequences of Canada’s wait-
ing lists were so severe, and because private
health insurance would give patients quicker
access to medical care, the prohibition on pri-
vate health insurance threatened the lives and
health of Canadian citizens.71
Two lower courts ruled against Chaoulli
and Zeliotis before the case reached the
Supreme Court of Canada.72 There, four of
the seven justices found the Quebec prohibi-
tions violated the Quebec Charter. They found
that Canada’s Medicare system forces
patients to wait for necessary—and even life-
saving—health care services, and that the
waiting lists were so long that the prohibi-
tion on private health insurance effectively
denied Quebec citizens their fundamental
rights to life and personal security.73 The
majority found that there was no rational
justification for the prohibition that would
override the harm. Justice Deschamps wrote
for the Court:
The central question raised by the
appeal is whether the prohibition is
justified by the need to preserve the
integrity of the public system. In this
regard, when my colleagues ask
whether Quebec has the power under
the constitution to discourage the
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establishment of a parallel health care
system, I can only agree with them that
it does. But that is not the issue in the
appeal. The appellants do not contend
that they have a constitutional right to
private insurance. Rather, they con-
tend that the waiting times violate
their rights to life and security. It is the
measure chosen by the government
that is in issue, not Quebec’s need for a
public health care system.74
Justice Deschamps further argued that
courts should not be timid when the political
branches of government threaten fundamen-
tal human rights:
This is not a case in which the Court
must show deference to the govern-
ment’s choice of measure. The Courts
have a duty to rise above political
debate. When, as in the case at bar, the
Courts are given the tools they need to
make a decision, they should not hesi-
tate to assume their responsibilities.
Deference cannot lead the judicial
branch to abdicate its role in favor of
the legislative branch or the executive
branch.75
The majority of the Court found that the
waiting times for health care services had
become “an implicit form of rationing” and
that prohibiting citizens from making their
own arrangements to purchase care infringed
upon the life and security of each citizen.76
Consequently, the court struck down the
prohibition on private health insurance on
the grounds that the law violated Section 1 of
the Quebec Charter.77
The Chaoulli decision did not completely
restore the right to purchase medical care
oneself. The Court found that the ban on pri-
vate health insurance violated the rights to
life and personal security only when the gov-
ernment failed to provide adequate care
through its Medicare program. Moreover,
Canadians have yet to sort out whether the
ruling applies only to Quebec, or to Canada
as a whole. Because of an abstention, the
Court was deadlocked over whether the ban
on private insurance violated the federal
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
In sum, the Canadian Medicare system
continues to threaten the patient’s right to
purchase medical care. Nevertheless, Canada
is moving in the right direction by allowing
some patients to purchase covered medical
services when the government-run program
fails to meet their needs. Unfortunately,
reformers in the United States are moving in
the opposite direction.
Conclusion
Among the hazards of universal coverage
is that when government fails to meet the
patient’s needs, it often prohibits patients
from purchasing medical care on their own.
That is not merely something that takes
place under some foreign systems of social-
ized medicine. It exists today, in the United
States, under the federal Medicare program.
The U.S. government effectively prohibits
Medicare beneficiaries from going outside
the Medicare program to obtain higher-qual-
ity care, or to keep private medical informa-
tion out of government databases. What lit-
tle progress has been made in preventing this
policy from blocking access to medical care
could be revoked at any time by an unelected
bureaucrat. This policy creates the very type
of two-tiered health care system its propo-
nents fear, and the gap between those two
tiers will grow as the Medicare’s fiscal prob-
lems worsen. In contrast, Canada’s system of
socialized medicine is moving (albeit slowly)
in the direction of greater protection of
patients’ rights. 
Congress should restore the freedom of
Medicare beneficiaries to spend their own
money on medical care as they see fit and pre-
vent the federal bureaucracy from interfering
in purely private and voluntary transactions
between patients and their doctors. Congress
should do so immediately, before Medicare’s
looming financial troubles combine with
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this unwise policy and begin denying care to
large numbers of seniors. 
Moreover, federal and state lawmakers
should reject health care reforms that would
encourage further interference in the private
decisions of American patients. The experi-
ence with both the Canadian and American
Medicare programs should serve as a cau-
tionary note for those who support a govern-
ment-run universal health care system: the
right to control one’s medical care is a fre-
quent casualty of such schemes. 
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